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What is a party?  We argue that the formal party apparatus is only one part of an 
extended network of interest groups, media, 527s, and candidates.  We systematically 
measure a portion of this network by tracking transfers of names between political 
organizations.  Our analysis reveals two distinct and polarized networks corresponding to 
a more liberal Democratic group and a more conservative Republican group.  Formal 
party organizations, like the Democratic National Committee and the Republican 
National Committee, tend to receive information within their respective networks, which 
suggests that other groups serve to funnel information toward the formal party. 
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There is a curious gap in the study of political parties and interest groups.  While 
there is a long and vibrant tradition of political science research on both parties and 
interest groups, we know very little about the connections between these two entities.  
One reason for this gulf is that we can think of parties and interest groups as competing 
forms of political organisations.  While parties attempt to build broad, multi-dimensional 
coalitions, interest groups mobilise narrow slices of the electorate around a focused set of 
issues.  Indeed, political parties may serve as the antidote for the narrow, self-serving 
agendas advocated by interest groups.1  However, many interest groups choose to 
cooperate with one party or the other on a persistent basis, and there has been very little 
research on these organisational ties. 
We also know little about the bonds between the political media and political 
parties. While Groseclose and Milyo2 measure ideological bias in the media, there has 
been little research on organisational ties between the press and political parties.  We 
know, for example, that the National Review is a conservative magazine that tends to 
favor Republicans over Democrats, but it will also occasionally assert its independence, 
criticising prominent GOP officeholders.  However, we are uncertain whether the 
National Review actually cooperates with the Republican Party and its candidates to 
promote conservative causes. 
We can better understand the scope and influence of political parties in America 
by studying their alliances with interest groups and media outlets. Toward this end, this 
exploratory study uses an innovative approach to identify links between formal party 
organisations and informal networks of interest groups, media, and 527s. We trace 
exchanges of donor and subscriber names between organisations and we use social 
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network analysis (SNA) to reveal the communities that drive modern politics.  While 
SNA is a prominent technique in economics and sociology, SNA research is still rare in 
political science.  SNA techniques are especially useful for studying political parties and 
interest groups since these actors are best understood as networks of cooperating allies 
rather than atomistic actors. 3   
We find that a significant number of nominally independent media outlets and 
interest groups exchange information with formal party organisations and ideologically 
similar organisations.  These “extended party networks,” as we call them, are starkly 
divided into polarised camps that funnel information to formal party organisations.  Our 
data tentatively suggest, furthermore, that the Democratic network is larger and more 
integrated than the Republican network.  These results suggest the value of viewing 
parties as social networks. 
FORMAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL NETWORKS 
An interesting puzzle in contemporary American politics is the escalating 
polarization of the nation’s political parties.  Recent scholarship agrees that something in 
politics has become polarised in the last few decades, but it is not clear just what that 
something is.  It might be tempting to say that the party-in-government is polarised, while 
the party-in-the-electorate is not. But the emerging consensus is slightly more 
complicated. Most scholars argue that while the “elite” parties (in Congress, campaigns, 
and commentary) are polarised,4 many ordinary voters may not be.5  But a large slice of 
the most active voters are polarised.6  This confusion highlights the importance of 
understanding the size and organization of political parties.  
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V.O. Key7 famously partitioned the study of political parties into the “party in 
government,” “party in the electorate,” and “party as organisation.”  Some research fits 
nicely into one of these categories, such as work on Congressional parties,8 mass 
partisanship9 and party organisations.10  Some research also traces the relationships 
between party segments.11   
 A notable omission from the Key trichotomy is the set of citizens who finance and 
staff political campaigns.12  These activists are essential to the functioning of modern 
parties, yet they are not part of the formal party organisation.  Beginning with James Q. 
Wilson’s13 work on “amateur” Democratic clubs, political scientists have sought to 
measure and explain the influence of party activists.14   
The Key trichotomy also omits interest groups.  While we observe close 
interaction and co-operation between formal parties and some organized groups in 
everyday life,15 political scientists typically study parties and interest groups separately or 
even portray them as competitors.  Schattscheider,16 for example, promotes parties as the 
antidote for excessive interest group influence in American politics. In practice, many 
interest groups emphatically claim they are nonpartisan, while parties deny linkages with 
outside groups.17  
Relatedly, the Key model omits the partisan media. Early in American history, 
media outlets were central to party activity.18 In the era of objective journalism, the major 
city newspapers are independent, but opinion journalism is not. Magazines such as The 
New Republic and the National Review would maintain that they are at least nominally 
independent of party organizations. But they also consistently take sides on partisan 
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matters. It is an open question just how similar they are to the partisan press of an earlier 
era.  
 Party activists, interest groups and the partisan media pose a conceptual challenge 
for the study of parties.  Unlike the party-in-government or party-as-organisation, these 
actors lack centralized leadership and transparent decision-making processes.  Like birds 
in a flock, activists, interest groups and the media are autonomous but cooperating.  They 
can pursue their common goals more effectively through co-operation, but no single actor 
appears to be in charge.    
 
Parties as Networks 
Our criticisms of Key’s tripartite model are, then, consistent with the view of 
parties offered by Downs19 (“a team of men seeking to control the governing apparatus”) 
and endorsed by Schlesinger20, or by Schattschneider21 (“an organized attempt to gain 
power”). However, while these authors do emphasize that parties are a coordinated team, 
they do not offer a rich conception of how different party actors interact in those teams. 
Since political parties in the United States are not hierarchically organized, we need to 
think about how they manage to coordinate in the absence of such organization. If all of 
these elements, formal and informal, are part of the team, what makes them team 
members? 
 A solution is to conceive of parties as networks of cooperating actors.  In this 
view, a party is broadly defined to include its candidates and officeholders; its formal 
apparatus; loyal donors, campaign workers, and activists; allied interest groups; and 
friendly media outlets.  We refer to these party teams as extended party networks (EPNs), 
 5 
which include — but are not limited to — formal party organisations such as the 
Democratic National Committee and the Republican National Committee.  In the network 
approach, the defining characteristic of a party is cooperative behaviour, not formal 
positions.  Actors “join” the party when they begin communicating with other members 
of the network, developing common strategies, and coordinating action to achieve shared 
goals.   
Power in a network is potentially decentralized; unlike the hierarchical structure 
of formal party organisations, networks may feature several actors or factions that 
simultaneously cooperate to beat the opposing party and compete to shape the future of 
the party.22  Network members often influence each other by sending informative signals 
(e.g. endorsements), linking network members together, and coordinating action.  
Politicians and organisations attach great value to their lists of other actors—especially 
donors and activists—in the network, and they share these lists cautiously. 
Typically, some actors exert more influence than others in a partisan network 
because they possess the connections and vision to coordinate collaborative effort.  Just 
as one department in a firm may not know about the firm’s overall strategy, some 
organisations in a party network may only know about their own connections. The key 
difference is that formal organisations include recognized authorities who possess the 
authority to enforce coordination and compliance. Without a hierarchy, more important 
players can only exert influence informally and indirectly.  
Researchers have begun to study parties as networks.  Schwartz23 found that the 
Republican elites in the state of Illinois are best understood as an organisation composed 
of formal and informal party leaders.  Similarly, Bernstein24 and Doherty25 found that 
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political consultants form part of an expanded party that is more loyal to the traditional 
party than to individual candidates.  Cohen et al.26 demonstrated that an alliance of 
donors and elite endorsers in each party have controlled presidential nominations since 
1980.  Dominguez,27 meanwhile, has found evidence of a network of donors and 
endorsers who coordinate to promote some candidates in congressional primaries and 
prevent others from winning.  Together, this research demonstrates the importance of 
studying the informal networks at the heart of modern American parties.28 Each aspect of 
the informal networks so far studied, however, is only one part, and little research has 
identified connections between parties, interest groups, and the media.29 
 In prior work on party networks, it has often been necessary to infer relationships 
from observable behaviour.  Thus candidates who share consultants, elites who endorse 
the same candidates, or interest groups who share donors are assumed to be linked.  This 
approach is necessitated by the behaviour of party officials and interest groups, who 
downplay the co-operation that is evident to political observers. In some cases, formal co-
operation is explicitly forbidden by campaign finance regulations. If party actors do not 
want outsiders to know that they are cooperating, direct observation may not reveal them 
doing so.  
 We extend the network approach using an innovative data collection effort to 
identify links between formal party organisations, interest groups, and the media.  We 
track transfers of vital information—the names of donors and subscribers—as a concrete 
measure of co-operation between political organisations.  We analyze these transfers 
using the concepts and methods of social network analysis (SNA). SNA focuses on the 
properties of societies and the role of individuals within their social context.  Thus we are 
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particularly interested in the relationships between political actors and the overall 
structure of the name-trading society.  In the next section we measure the bonds between 
each formal party and its allies, the extent to which the allies of one party exchange 
information with the allies of the opposing party, which actors are more likely to provide 
information, and which are more likely to receive it.   
The Name Game 
Since communication is a defining feature of party networks, the obvious 
measurement strategy is to search for evidence that EPN members exchange information 
with politicians and formal parties.  However, most interaction between parties and 
interest groups is unobserved by outsiders.  There are no public transcripts of meetings 
between interest group leaders and Congressional leaders, no roll call votes for social 
scientists to pore over.  To a significant degree, formal parties and their allies collude 
privately while publicly stressing their autonomy.   
 We identify these opaque relationships by tracking mailing list exchanges.  The 
names of donors and subscribers are of considerable value to political actors.30  
Cultivating a list of people who are willing to donate to a cause can demand a great deal 
of time and energy.  Rather than develop a list on its own, an organisation will frequently 
purchase such a list from a like-minded group; lists are frequently traded or sold among 
interest groups, magazines, formal party groups, candidate campaign committees, and 
other organisations.  For example, donors to Howard Dean’s presidential campaign 
would be likely to donate to other progressive candidates and causes across state lines, 
and whomever Dean decides to give his list to would obtain a great advantage in 
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fundraising.  By tracking addresses as they are sold or traded we can map the links 
between political organisations.31 
Our data identify which organizations are willing to engage in a limited form of 
cooperation with each other.  They do not, regrettably, provide a full “map” of the two 
party networks.  There are undoubtedly organizations that are strongly allied with one 
major party but missing from our data.  Furthermore, exchanging mailing lists is just one 
of many possible forms of cooperation between members of a party network; for other 
forms of cooperation the membership and organization of party networks may change.  
We focus on lists exchanges because they are a traceable form of cooperation.  
In typical mailing list exchanges, an organisation leases some subset of its list to 
another organisation or publication for a single usage in exchange for a rental fee, which 
varies with the size and quality of the list.32  Occasionally such exchanges will be 
facilitated by a list broker, who receives a fee for pairing an organisation’s list with a 
prospective buyer. Since most exchanges are for a one-time use, the buyer cannot sell the 
names to yet another organisation, and no master list is ever generated. 
 We assume that expected profit is a necessary condition for one organisation to 
solicit names from another; organisations try to rent lists that will yield more donations 
than the cost of the mailing.33  This is not a trivial goal – a successful “cold” direct mail 
solicitation will rarely secure donations from more than one or two percent of its 
recipients.  Short term profit, however, is not the only consideration for list owners.  
There are several reasons that list owners might turn away a bid for their lists.  First, a list 
owner’s reputation might suffer if the list buyer is disreputable, and vice versa.  For 
example, many organisations would refuse to share their lists with the Ku Klux Klan.  
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Second, a list owner may refuse an offer to avoid annoying the donors or subscribers on 
the list with an excessive number of unsolicited requests for donations.  Third, a list 
owner must trust that the list recipient will not use the information to harm the owner.  
One possibility is that an interest group in the same niche may attempt to steal members 
from the list owner.  A second scenario is that a list recipient may try to convince group 
members that their group leaders are doing a bad job or taking an incorrect issue position.  
The Democratic National Committee, for example, might try to convince members of the 
National Rifle Association that their leaders are extremists.  The Republican National 
Committee might try to sell members of the American Association of Retired People on 
the idea of investing Social Security funds in the stock market.  To avoid such challenges, 
organisation leaders have an incentive to scrutinise list-renting proposals and refuse to 
share information with organisations that are notorious or opposed to the owner’s 
interests.34 
A weak interpretation of each name trade, then, is that it represents an economic 
exchange based on the list buyer’s expectation that the list will generate positive net 
revenue.  A slightly stronger interpretation is that there are two necessary conditions for 
each exchange:  the expectation of net revenue, and mutual respect and trust.  For this 
exploratory analysis we are largely agnostic whether “pure profit” or “profit plus politics” 
is the primary mechanism. However, some of our results do indicate that political kinship 
factors into list exchanges. Almost none of the actors we examined sold a list to a 
commercial, non-political enterprise. One way to distinguish these motives is to think of 
profit as the baseline incentive. It is then useful to imagine what the data would look like 
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if profit were the only motive. We could then ask how partisan exchange might change 
the data. 
A Simple Model of Name Trading 
We propose a simple economic model of name trades. Assume that both groups 
soliciting donations and the potential donors have ideal points in a unidimensional35 
policy space. Assume also that the probability of a donation, given a solicitation, is a 
decreasing function of the distance between the donor and the group.  
We begin by claiming that each group develops its own list of names from non-
trading behaviour. Most list trades are temporary – a group leases the list but does not get 
permanent access to it. But some donors seek out the group, and others come across 
solicitations that are not from traded lists. We further claim that the donors in each 
group’s list are distributed about the group’s ideal point. 
Since solicitations are costly (in postage and printing), groups will not solicit 
donors who are far from them. Specifically, group j will solicit potential donor i if and 
only if  
CS < piD 
Where  
CS is the cost of a solicitation 
pi is the probability that donor i will donate to group j, which in turn is a 
decreasing function of the distance between the group j and donor i. 
D is the expected donation from the potential donor. 
We do not need to define the functional form of the probability to see the most 
important implications of the model. It defines an interval around each group that 
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includes donors that group would like to solicit. A group will purchase a list if it overlaps 
this interval enough that the total expected gain from soliciting that list is greater than the 
cost of that list (CLIST): 
! 
CLIST < piD"C( )
i#LIST
$  
This will be more likely when the group selling the list has an ideal point closer to the 
group buying it. So groups buy lists from their ideological neighbors. 
What does this say about the nature of the social networks we will uncover when 
we look at name trading? First, it says that the apparent social network depends on the 
distribution of donors and groups. If either donors or groups are in clusters far away from 
one another, then groups in those clusters will trade among themselves and we will not 
see much across them. Alternatively, if there are donors and groups across the entire 
political spectrum, we should expect to see one network connected from one end to the 
other. Groups at the two extremes might never trade with one another, but a daisy-chain 
of trades would connect everyone into one network. What the distribution of donors and 
groups looks like is an empirical question. 
The empirical answer is that donors and groups are not so polarised that they 
would not support any overlap. Figure 1 shows the ideological distribution of respondents 
in the 2004 National Election Study who say they have made a political donation. This 
subset of respondents is less moderate than the general population, but the distribution is 
not bimodal. There are potential donors, many of them, in the middle of the distribution. 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
What about groups? It is harder to measure the ideological spread of groups, but 
McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal36 have some evidence, using the ideological locations of 
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the member of Congress that political action committees donate to. The distribution of 
the mean ideal point of the recipients of each group’s donations is not bimodal, but rather 
is concentrated in the middle.37 Their finding echoes the legal conclusion in McConnell v. 
FEC, that interest groups were donating to candidates of both parties, and thus are likely 
not ideologically motivated.38 In other words, there are at least some groups that do 
bridge between the two ideological clusters, at least when it comes to campaign 
donations. This is no doubt for strategic reasons, but it means that the groups are 
moderate enough that their interests might be met by the opposing party. 
However, PACs and interest groups that donate to campaigns are not exactly the 
same as the interest groups that we discuss here. It may be that the moderate groups are 
disproportionately not the kinds of groups that solicit donors from the population. 
However, we do think it is suggestive that there are groups across the political spectrum. 
We also note that there are a number of groups that claim to be moderate ideologically.  
Thus we feel comfortable claiming that the distribution of ideal points for donors 
is not extremely polarised, and we tentatively claim that it is not obviously polarised for 
groups. It is not necessary for the distribution to be unimodal or uniform, only that there 
is considerable representation across the spectrum. If so, absent any additional sorting 
behaviour, we might expect purely profit-motivated groups to generate a network that is 
connected from one end to the other by a daisy chain of donations. If not, then name-
trading between groups may reflect collaboration that is difficult to explain simply in 
terms of preferences and financial incentives.  We turn now to the practice of exchanging 
mailing lists. 
   DATA AND METHODS 
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 Our first challenge was to collect data on information exchange between political 
organisations.  We gave donations and subscribed to an initial sample of 50 candidates, 
political organisations, and publications in February 2004, using a unique name for each 
contribution.  We then tracked subsequent solicitations to each name.  The initial sample 
was selected to include an ideologically diverse set of party organisations, magazines, 
and interest groups, and (at the time) every major candidate for president.  We held the 
address (a new post office box in Los Angeles, California) and donation size ($25) 
constant; for periodicals we chose the subscription offer closest to $25.  When we 
received subsequent solicitations from organisations outside the initial sample, we were 
able to trace the unique name from its source to its recipient.  For example, in February 
2004 we donated $25 to Americans for Democratic Action using a unique name; we 
subsequently received solicitations from America Coming Together and Project Vote 
Smart to the same name. 
 Our initial sample was like a drop in a wide pool, and our goal was to see where 
the ripples led.  We therefore donated $25 under unique names to each subsequent 
solicitor in November 2004 (110 new donations) and April 2005 (170 new donations).  
This “following-up” technique is known as snowball sampling.  In the vocabulary of 
social network analysis, each exchange is a “directed” relationship, with one actor 
sending and another receiving information with no reciprocal exchange implied.39 
 Our use of snowball sampling imposes limits on our inferences that we note 
below when appropriate.  Essentially, comparisons between organisations in the initial 
sample and those in subsequent samples are complicated by the different lengths of time 
we observe their behaviour, and by the selection bias used for the second and third 
 14 
waves.  With our short time frame, we also cannot say much about the dynamics of the 
name-trading process.  
However, our approach is appropriate for this exploratory study; since we know 
little about the extended party, it was appropriate to let the name-trading network reveal 
itself.  Furthermore, the financial cost of sampling organisations puts a premium on 
identifying organisations that actively trade names. We simply must be cautious not to 
extrapolate much beyond the 2004-2005 period we have chosen. Those years included a 
contest for the Democratic Party nomination but no contest in the Republican Party. They 
included a presidential election, and the same party controlled the White House and both 
houses of Congress for the entire period. All of those factors might affect differences 
between the parties in our data. A longer time period might reveal patterns we do not 
observe here. 
 This process yielded a sample of 286 organisations in three waves.  For this 
analysis we excluded all California-specific organisations (e.g. the Los Angeles Times 
Family Fund).  Sixteen organisations—obviously all in the initial wave—exchanged no 
information at all.  Two general patterns are worth noting.  First, the network is not very 
dense.  There were 433 connections between all the actors (or “nodes” in social network 
vocabulary) out of a possible 81,510.  This is unsurprising since we expected that many 
transfers would not happen (e.g. National Review to the Democratic National 
Committee).  Second, most actors tend to be primarily sources or consumers of 
information.  Thirty organisations both gave and received information; the rest were 
either name sources or name takers.  Only five pairs of organisations (1.17% of all ties) 
swapped address lists in a reciprocal relationship.  
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 The next section analyzes our data in greater depth under the headings of 
polarisation and centralisation.  For simplicity, we explain the details of our methods as 
we go rather than present the techniques and results separately.  All analysis was 
conducted within UCINET 6 and all figures were created using the embedded 
NETDRAW software.40 
POLARISATION AND EXTENDED PARTIES 
 A threshold question is whether some interest groups and media groups cooperate 
primarily with the Democratic Party while others tend to work with the Republican Party.  
If all groups—or at least moderate groups—trade freely across the network, then we may 
conclude that most interest groups and media outlets are free agents who deal with both 
sides.  If, on the other hand, we find that our political organisations are grouped into two 
distinct clusters with little overlap, we may infer the existence of distinct party networks.  
We begin our analysis with a basic measure of polarisation—the distance (number of 
steps) between the Democratic and Republican formal organisations—and then apply a 
more formal measure of the connections between party members and across the party 
divide.41 
Let us begin with a simple question:  how long are the “walks” from formal 
Democratic to Republican committees, and vice versa?  A walk is a sequence of edges (or 
connections) from one node to another.  For example, if the Democratic National 
Committee (DNC) directly shared names with the Republican National Committee 
(RNC), that would be a walk of length one.  If the DNC shared with Greenpeace, 
Greenpeace shared with the National Rifle Association (NRA), and the NRA shared with 
the RNC, that would be a walk of length three.   
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As it turns out, there are no directed walks from any Democratic Party 
committee—the DNC, Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC), or 
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee—to any Republican committee (RNC, 
National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC), or National Republican 
Congressional Committee (NRCC)).  That is, there is no sequence of name exchanges 
from one formal party to the other.  By itself, this is partial evidence of polarisation, but it 
also suggests the general thinness of the network. 
More interestingly, the two parties seem to behave differently within their own 
networks:  Democratic organisations are more actively involved in information exchange.  
Table 1 displays the number of direct connections and other walks for each party 
committee. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
As Table 1 shows, the DNC is involved in 14 total exchanges while the RNC is involved 
in five.  The DCCC received ten names to the NRCC’s three.  This suggests that 
Democratic committees are more active players in the name game.   
The difference between the Democratic and Republican networks is further 
evident in Figure 2, which displays the egonets for each party’s committees.  An “egonet” 
is the set of contacts for a specific actor or, in this case, two sets of actors; it also shows 
links between these affiliated nodes.   All figures are made using NETDRAW’s “spring-
embedding” algorithm with minor modifications for visibility. 
[FIGURE 2A and 2B ABOUT HERE] 
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The Democratic egonet contains four media outlets and nine interest groups.  The 
Republican egonet, in contrast, consists of four magazines.  Again, the formal 
Democratic Party is involved in more transfers than its Republican counterpart. 
 Having found no “walks” between Democratic and Republican parties due, in 
part, to the Republicans’ comparative lack of ties, what other measures can we use to test 
for partisan polarisation?  A more sophisticated approach is to identify factions in the 
dataset.  A “faction,” in social networks parlance, is a collection of nodes that are more 
tightly connected to one another than to other nodes.42  To identify factions, NETDRAW 
software iteratively searches for a distribution of nodes among a selected number of 
factions to minimise the number of connections between factions and to maximise the 
number of connections within factions.     
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 3 illustrates the separation of political organisations into three factions, 
revealing the polarisation in the information-trading network.  The largest faction, shown 
on the left as circles, is the liberal/Democratic network with 181 nodes.  The next largest 
faction with 79 nodes is a conservative/Republican network, shown on the right as 
triangles.  Both networks suggest a core-periphery structure, with a dense inner network 
of closely connected groups and a fringe of “pendants,” i.e. groups with only one 
connection.  This is partially due to the data collection process; many of the pendants are 
from later waves and were not observed for the entire sampling period.  The number of 
nodes involved renders it inconvenient to label each group, but the distribution 
corresponds to the expectations of most observers.  The Democratic network includes the 
formal Democratic Party; interest groups such as the Sierra Club, National Organization 
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for Women, and People For the American Way; publications like The Nation; and the 
527 group America Coming Together.  The Republican network includes publications 
like the Weekly Standard and Human Events and interest groups like Club for Growth 
and Focus on the Family.  For clarity, some groups are put into a “fringe” faction with 
distinct clusters tied to Foreign Affairs and Howard Dean’s presidential campaign.43  
As we expected, there are relatively few links between the Democratic and 
Republican networks.  Just eight of 433 transfers were between groups in the two major 
factions.  These links, moreover, are almost exclusively by media outlets that solicit 
readers across the divide—e.g. the Economist, the Wall Street Journal, and Mother 
Jones.44  It is not surprising that publications were more likely to solicit customers in both 
networks.  Subscribing to a magazine does not carry the same political weight as 
donating to a cause, and people interested in politics may want to read a variety of 
publications.  Since many media actors are deeply committed to some notion of 
objectivity, they can offer something to consumers who generally disagree with a 
publication’s perspective. 
While some media sought customers across the spectrum, there were zero 
connections between the formal party organisations and members of the opposing party’s 
network.  That is, the DNC didn’t solicit Human Events readers, and the RNC didn’t 
solicit donors to NOW, etc.  This is consistent with the claim that information-sharing is 
much more likely to occur within two distinct camps rather than across the spectrum.  In 
particular, interest groups involved in name transfers seemed to trade only with formal 
party committees and interest groups within one party network or the other. 
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This impression that there are two polarised party networks can be measured more 
formally using the External-Internal (E-I) Index.45  The E-I Index is simply the number of 
inter-faction ties minus the number of intra-faction ties, divided by the total number of 
ties.  It varies from 1 (all ties are between factions) to -1 (all ties are within factions).  
The E-I Index for our three-faction network is -.953.46  It is not surprising that the E-I 
index is negative since the factions were calculated to maximise intra-EPN ties, but this 
index score suggests almost perfect polarisation between the two EPNs.  By comparison, 
random links between the actors in these groups would have an average E-I index of 
0.048 (p < 0.001). 
These results are consistent with the claim that a significant portion of the 
politically active citizens are divided into competing camps. If this separation is what we 
mean by polarisation, then it is consistent with polarisation.  They may not be far from 
each other in ideological space –  as Figure 1 shows – but they are separated into two 
groups, despite their closeness ideologically. This perhaps suggests we need to think 
about polarization in a different way, or that we should think about “separation,” of the 
sort we have identified here, instead of “polarization.” More work would be needed on 
mass attitudes to address this question.  
Mail solicitations are targeted to those who seem likely to give some money based 
on their prior donations and subscriptions.  Political organisations, in turn, behave as if 
there is not some large mass of moderate participants, but rather that there are two 
distinct groups.  However, the sharp distinction between the two party networks and the 
absence of non-political groups taking names from across the ideological spectrum 
suggest that, in addition to the polarisation of political activists, there is an element of 
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organisational cleavage as well.  Indeed, the fact that there are only ten organisations that 
fall into the nonaligned “fringe” faction suggests that there are few groups that are truly 
profit-seeking or politically independent in our sample.    
CENTRALITY WITHIN EXTENDED PARTIES 
 We are also interested in the relationship between the formal party and the 
extended networks of allied media and interest groups.  Are formal parties just “part of 
the gang,” or are they at the apex of the party pyramid?  There are multiple measures of 
the relative importance, or centrality, of actors within a society.47  We begin with a 
simple measure of centrality by illustrating the connections within each EPN, then we 
describe the number of transfers by each organisation.  Finally, as explained below, we 
estimate the centrality of major organisations, taking into account the “quality” of their 
trading partners.  
As noted, there is a great deal of information sharing within the Democratic 
network.  There were 318 transfers within the Democratic network, only 25 of which 
involved the DNC, DSCC, or DCCC.  The remaining transfers connected one non-
committee member to another, with an average of 3.3 non-committee transfers per 
organisation within the Democratic network.  While a full map of the Democratic 
network is difficult to display, Figure 4 depicts all organisations in the Democratic 
network that participated in five or more exchanges.  If the formal party was the central 
actor in the network, we would only see ties between the party committees and other 
groups, like a hub and spokes.  Figure 4, however, includes numerous links between non-
committee organisations.  This is consistent with the claim that the “party” extends 
beyond its formal apparatus to include a network of interest group and media allies. 
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[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Also telling is Howard Dean’s complete absence from the Democratic network. 
At first blush, it might seem curious that the current head of the DNC was not connected 
to the party network in early 2004. However, given what we are attempting to measure, 
this is appropriate. In early 2004, Dean was a party insurgent and outsider. While he 
shared many ideological positions with the liberal network, he did not coordinate with it. 
Dean’s list would have been valuable to liberal groups and other presidential candidates. 
But while Dean was willing to share the list with some outside businesses, he did not 
share names with actors in the Democratic network. This accurately places Dean outside 
the party network in early 2004, and captures political behaviour at odds with a purely 
economic rationale for list sharing. The party network in early 2004 included non-formal 
actors such as Americans for Democratic Action and People for the American Way, but 
the network did not include Dean. 
 While the Democratic network is dense, the Republican network is not.  Figure 5 
presents the entire network minus single-connection “pendants.”  The most prominent 
pattern in Figure 4 is the role of news magazines.  Without their active name-sharing, the 
Republican network would be even smaller and less active.  There were 88 transfers 
between non-formal party nodes within the Republican network, a mean of 2.3 per 
organisation.   
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
We cannot be sure if the Republican Party’s relative lack of connections is a 
feature of the party or the period studied. Since the Democratic Party had a contested 
presidential nomination right at the beginning of our sample, the Democratic network 
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might have been simply more active for longer, and this is why we see the relationship. 
Alternatively, the Republican Party might be less informal, and thus rely less on the 
connections we are measuring.  
But the connections are still present. Figure 5 is what we would expect to see in a 
party network, with a twist.  There is the expected combination of party committees, 
candidates, interest groups, and conservative media.  The inclusion of two alternative 
medicine publications, Health & Healing and Mountain Home Nutritionals, is 
presumably spurious and due to Human Event’s “liberal” attitude toward name-sharing.  
These links suggest a profit motive for exchanging names, but the fact that there are so 
few such transfers also suggests an element of political co-operation in the broader 
network—most of the time, organisations seem to be trading names with their friends 
instead of selling to any available buyer.  In addition, John Thune is the only 
Congressional candidate in Figure 5.  In 2004, Thune unseated Senate minority leader 
Thomas Daschle (D - South Dakota) in a close, very expensive, and nationally watched 
contest, so his appearance in the dataset suggests that he solicited from a national base of 
donors with the aid of conservative magazines.  
 A simple measure of each organisation’s centrality is its degree, or number of 
information transfers.  In order to ensure that we are not making invalid comparisons 
across different waves of our sample, we focus on organisations in the initial sample and 
classified as part of the Democratic or Republican networks.  Table 2 presents the 
number of names given and received for each group; the Democratic side excludes 
groups involved in fewer than five transfers.   Both sides are organized with the most 
active groups toward the top of the table. 
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[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Eleven of the twelve most active groups in the Democratic network were 
primarily donors of information; they gave or sold names away, but rarely obtained 
names from other sources.  This included both interest groups and publications.  Indeed, 
the only interest group in this sample which was primarily a recipient of information was 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.  On the other hand, 
formal party organisations were more likely to act as recipients of information.  The DNC 
received eight names and shared six, while the DCCC kept its information in-house while 
collecting from ten other sources.  The DSCC, not shown, received one name and shared 
with no one.  To the extent that organisations favor their friends when making transfers, 
this pattern suggests that Democratic Party committees have a position of prestige in the 
network; other groups aid the committees by sharing information.   
A similar pattern occurs on the Republican side, although there are fewer cases to 
consider.  Three magazines in the original sample were active sources of names but not 
major recipients of information.  Like the DNC, the RNC gave and received with roughly 
equal frequency.  The RNC, only shared with organisations tied to President Bush—the 
2004 campaign and the White House.  Like the DCCC, the NRCC did not share names. 
While each actor’s degree and propensity to share conveys a great deal of 
information, it is also possible to measure centrality by weighing each organisation’s 
position within its party network.  We do so using a formal measure of the proximity of 
each organisation to every other actor in a network known as “closeness.”  Specifically, 
we calculate the shortest path from one node to every other node, then take the reciprocal 
of than number as a measure of closeness.48  Finally, we normalise this statistic by 
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expressing the observed closeness as a percentage of the maximum possible closeness, 
i.e. if every node in a party network was directly connected to each other.  We calculate 
each actor’s “in-closeness,” or centrality as a receiver of names, separately from “out-
closeness,” or centrality as a name donor.  
These results are in the right-hand columns of Table 2.  They support the claim 
that formal party organisations are primary recipients of information within each party 
network.  The DCCC, DNC, and Kerry campaigns ranked first, second, and third in in-
closeness in the Democratic network, while the RNC, Bush-Cheney campaign, and 
NRCC ranked first, second, and fourth  in in-closeness in the Republican network.  
Publications ranked highest in Republican network out-closeness, while a mix of interest 
groups (e.g. the ACLU) and publications (American Prospect, Nation, New Republic) 
ranked highest in out-closeness among Democratic groups.  These organisations were not 
just name sources; they shared names to organisations that were also active name-traders.   
DISCUSSION 
 Our results suggest the existence of two major networks of ideological teammates, 
polarised from each other.  It is no surprise that the national Democratic and Republican 
committees do not exchange information.  However, the gap between the formal party 
organisations extends to the constellations of interest groups and magazines that trade 
information with each formal party.  A simple measure of this broader polarisation is that 
there is no path from one formal party entity to an organisation of the opposing party.  
When we partitioned the name-trading actors into factions, we identified two distinct 
major coalitions: one liberal and Democratic and the other conservative and Republican.   
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It is unlikely that this polarisation is due to the divergent political views of the 
donor and subscriber base for the organisations in our dataset, since we saw in Figure 1 
that while the most politically active Americans tend to be more polarised than their less 
involved counterparts, many moderates do contribute. A more likely possibility is that the 
groups themselves are polarised, although we have argued that there is some evidence to 
believe that there should be enough moderate groups to span the gap. The separation of 
organisations into two distinct party networks may also reflect deliberate collaboration as 
well as market mechanisms.  We observe relatively little name-trading between moderate 
organisations in different networks despite the potential for profitable outreach.  Further, 
while a few organisations—such as the Howard Dean campaign—did sell names to non-
political businesses, the scarcity of name transfers to businesses also suggests that 
political organisations are not simply selling names to any available bidder and, instead, 
favor their friends. 
Our data also suggest that formal party organisations tend to be information 
receivers within their respective networks; other media and interest groups provide the 
formal parties with names, while party committees are more likely to share information 
with candidates or to keep names for themselves.   
This pattern implies that while the formal party organizations are not the entire 
party, they are important players in it. Membership information flows to the formal 
organizations, allowing them the broadest access to the donor base of the party. But it 
would be reasonable to conclude also that the formal organization relies on the rest of the 
network to mobilise and collect that information. At the very least, the access points for 
donors and perhaps activists to the party network appear to be decentralized. 
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The conception of parties as networks has implications for the direct study of the 
constituent elements. Some strains of interest group research place a central emphasis on 
the connections of interest groups to party networks, especially where a group is attached 
to one party and clearly not another. This work should continue. Research on the media 
also ought to explore the connections between journalists and party actors. Newspapers 
of an earlier era in the United States were explicitly partisan. We think a set of modern 
magazines ought to be seen that way as well.  
These results should be interpreted with care.  First, we should note that the 
extended parties we identify in this study are not complete.  There are many other 
organisations that informed observers might categorise as affiliated with a political party 
(e.g. the National Federation of Independent Businesses—Republicans; AFL-CIO—
Democrats) that do not appear in our dataset.49  Our measurement of name exchanges 
necessarily excludes those groups that do not solicit small donors or new members from 
the general population.  Additionally, there are important groups to which we donated, 
such as the National Rifle Association and MoveOn.org, that nonetheless do not appear 
in the dataset.  This should not be interpreted as a sign that these organisations do not 
matter or that they do not trade names; we simply did not observe them doing it.  Third, 
the links we find between specific organisations and the Democratic or Republican 
parties are often indirect.  We should not be hasty to label as “partisan” specific 
organisations with a low number of indirect ties to parties.  However, we do have more 
confidence the general pattern of polarisation that emerges from these indirect 
relationships is valid and noteworthy. 
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Finally, as with any exploratory work, additional research is required to validate 
and extend this project.  It would be helpful, for example, to vary the size of initial 
donations or location of mailing addresses, to change the initial sample for a snowball 
study, or to utilise a large scale single-step survey.  It would be extremely valuable to 
collect information on party networks over time to evaluate the stability of extended party 
membership and centrality over time.  We hope that our effort sparks additional 
investigation of extended party networks.   
More broadly, this article and its companion works on the network structure of 
political parties should prompt a reconsideration of conventional views about American 
political parties.  What does it mean for a network party to be “strong” or “weak”?  How 
and why do party networks change and realign?  How do changes in electoral rules and 
governing institutions affect party networks?  When we think of parties as networks of 
formal and informal actors, we gain a fresh perspective on the classic questions of party 
research. 
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FIGURE 1: Ideological Distribution of Donors
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Figure 2A.  Egonet of Democratic Formal Party Organisations 
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Figure 2B.  Egonet of Republican Formal Party Organisations 
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Figure 3. The Polarised Network:  A Three Faction Depiction 
 
The Democratic EPN is depicted as circles, the Republican EPN as triangles, and the “Other” faction is squares. 
Unconnected groups not shown. 
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Figure 4. The Extended Democratic Network 
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Figure 5.  The Extended Republican Network 
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Table 1.  List Exchanges Involving Formal Party Organisations  
 
Democrats Names 
Given 
Names 
Received 
Republicans Names 
Given 
Names 
Received 
DNC 
DSCC 
DCCC 
6 
0 
0 
8 
1 
10 
RNC 
NRSC 
NRCC 
2 
0 
0 
3 
0 
3 
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Table 2.  Information Sharing by Democratic and Republican Network Members in the Initial Sample 
 
 Names 
Given/Received 
% Received In-Closeness 
(Rank) 
Out-Closeness 
(Rank) 
Democratic Party Network 
Americans for Democratic Action 29/0 0% 0        (11) 22.9       (6) 
American Prospect 25/2 7% 1.6       (8) 34.4       (2) 
Sierra Club 21/4 16% 2.8       (7) 18.6       (7) 
People for the American Way 16/5 24% 4.9       (5) 12.7     (11) 
Nation 18/2 10% 1.6       (8) 33.4       (3) 
ACLU 20/0 0% 0       (11) 35.3       (1) 
Amnesty International 19/0 0% 0       (11) 26.3       (5) 
Democratic National Committee 6/8 57% 6.7      (2)     7.6      (14) 
Common Cause 12/2 14% 1.1    (10) 13.2 (10) 
Brady Campaign to Prevent Handgun Violence 16/0 0% 0      (11) 16.6        (8) 
New Republic 14/0 0% 0      (11) 29.5        (4) 
EMILY's List 12/1 8% 2.9     (6) 14.1        (9) 
Democratic Cong. Campaign Committee 0/10 100% 7.7     (1)      0          (15) 
Lieberman for President* 8/0 0% 0     (11)     9.9      (12) 
Kerry for President 2/4 67% 5.5     (3)       7.6         (13) 
NAACP 0/5 100% 5.2     (4)     0         (15) 
Republican Party Network 
Human Events 32/0 0% 0       (8) 67.4 (1) 
National Review 16/2 11% 3.2    (5) 25.6 (2) 
Weekly Standard 7/0 0% 0       (8) 20.3 (3) 
Republican National Committee 2/3 60% 5.1    (1) 3.2 (4) 
Bush/Cheney 2004 2/3 60% 5.1 (1) 3.2 (4) 
National Republican Congressional Committee  0/3 100% 3.8    (4) 0 (6) 
Club for Growth 0/3 100% 4.5    (3) 0 (6) 
Seniors Coalition 0/1 100% 1.9    (6) 0 (6) 
Washington Times Weekly 0/1 100% 1.3    (7) 0 (6) 
 
In-Closeness and Out-Closeness are calculated using reciprocal geodesic paths and normalized as a percentage of the maximum 
possible closeness.  Six Democratic-connected actors involved in fewer than five transfers are omitted. 
* The Lieberman campaign’s low in-degree may be due to Senator Lieberman’s decision to drop out of the Presidential primary race 
soon after our donation arrived. 
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